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Comparative Essay
The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate




A corporation is an artificial entity managed by designated
natural persons.' The corporation's business is performed by
specific groups. One of the most salient characteristics found in
modern corporate statutes is the separation of corporate owner-
ship from the company's managerial hierarchy.2
In the United States, under early common law, a board of
directors was not necessary for a corporation. Acting by a ma-
jority, shareholders retained all the corporate powers, unless
* Assistant Professor of Law, College of Law, Soongsil University, Seoul, South
Korea. LL.B. 1988, & LL.M. 1990, College of Law, Yonsei University; LL.M. 1991,
School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley; S.J.D. 1995,
Georgetown University Law Center.
1. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 466 (1983). In an early federal case, former Chief
Justice Marshall referred to the corporation as an "artificial being." Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). Today, it is also viewed as
a legal fiction. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311
(1976). The South Korean Commercial Code states that a hoesa, or a business corpo-
ration, is defined as "an association incorporated for the purpose of engaging in
commercial activities and/or any other profit-making activities." COM. CODE art. 169
(S. Korea). As a juristic person under South Korean law, a corporation enjoys an in-
dependent personality separate from its owners. Id. at art. 171(1).
2. See generally JOHN CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES (1994); ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL
MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 265-326 (1995).
3. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 87 (1976).
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they explicitly delegated these powers to management.4 At pre-
sent, a corporation in the United States is statutorily operated
by three groups: shareholders, directors, and officers.' The rela-
tionship among and the legal responsibilities of these groups
generally form an inverted pyramid.6 The top of the inverted
pyramid is occupied by shareholders, who have the authority to
elect and monitor directors and approve fundamental or ex-
traordinary changes, such as amending the articles of incorpora-
tion, merger, consolidation, sale of substantially all assets, and
dissolution.7 In the middle are the directors who run the corpo-
ration, formulate corporate policy, and select officers to carry
out that policy.' In the United States, an audit committee is
usually established under or within the board of directors. 9 Fi-
nally, officers who are responsible for the day-to-day operations
of the corporation are normally at the bottom of the inverted
pyramid.1°
South Korean corporate law, which is directly applicable to
corporate governance and is found in Book III of the South Ko-
rean Commercial Code," does not adopt the same model of cor-
porate structure in a chusik hoesa (stock corporation) as found
in U.S. corporations." The South Korean Commercial Code al-
locates power among three groups: shareholders, directors, and
4. Id.
5. JOHN E. MOYE, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 199-200 (5th ed.
1999).
6. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 241 (7th ed. unabr. 1995).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. CHARKHAM, supra note 2, at 191.
10. Id.
11. Bernard Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium:
Enhancing International Competitiveness, Final Report and Legal Reform Recom-
mendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537,
554 (2001) (noting that South Korean corporate law, composed of provisions affect-
ing business organizations, is contained in the South Korean Commercial Code); Jae
Y. Kwon, An Isolation in Systems of Law: Differences Between the Commercial Codes
of the United States and Korea, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1996) (stating that
"[miost South Korean corporate law is embodied in Book III, which makes up more
than one half of the South Korean Commercial Code").
12. The concept and legal nature of the chusik hoesa is very similar to that of a
stock corporation, the most popular corporation in many other countries, including
the United States. See Craig Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Gov-
ernance in Korea's Largest Companies, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 34 (2000). For
the major characteristics of a chusik hoesa, see Young-Moo Kim & Joel A.
Silverman, Legal Forms of Doing Business in Korea, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA
213, 215-22 (Chan-Jin Kim ed., 2d ed. 1988).
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statutory auditors or audit committees.13 The conceptual basis
of South Korean corporate law generally adheres to the notion of
separation of ownership and management. 4 Nevertheless,
shareholders retain only limited rights, defined by the board of
directors, related to control of the corporation. 5 As the ultimate
owners of the corporation, however, shareholders can exercise
rights to matters reserved for themselves in order to express
their views on management and translate their dissatisfaction
into action.' 6 Ultimately, the right to vote at the general share-
holders meeting combined with their non-voting rights gives
shareholders influence over corporate affairs.
7
Shareholders, directors, and audit committees are common
both in the United States and South Korea. In both countries,
shareholders own the corporation and directors manage the cor-
poration.' However, the U.S. concept of corporate officers can-
not find its exact counterpart in the South Korean Commercial
Code, 9 while the South Korean concept of statutory auditors is
foreign to U.S. law.2°
This Essay explores the role and functions of intra-
corporate bodies by statutorily comparing the corporate govern-
ance structures of South Korea and the United States.2' Section
13. See generally COM. CODE BOOK III (S. Korea).
14. See generally COM. CODE arts. 288-435 (S. Korea).
15. Jooyoung Kim & Joongi Kim, Shareholder Activism in Korea: A Review of
How PSPD Has Used Legal Measures to Strengthen Korean Corporate Governance, 1
J. Korean L. 51, 54 (2001).
16. See Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 35.
17. Id.
18. DONG-YOON CHUNG, HOESABOB [CORPORATE LAw] 172 (7th ed. 2001).
19. A counterpart to the U.S. definition of officers such as the president, vice
president, treasurer, or secretary is not provided in the South Korean Commercial
Code. The Code never attempts to classify persons who administer the day-to-day
affairs of the corporation as officers. Kon Sik Kim, Chaebol and Corporate Govern-
ance in Korea 142 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washing-
ton) (on file with author) [hereinafter K. Kim]. Instead, the antitrust act of South
Korea defines the term "officers" to include "a director, representative director,
managing partner with unlimited liability, auditor or person holding a commercial
employer such as manager who is authorized to administrate the general business of
the main or branch office" of a corporation. MONOPOLY REGULATION AND FAIR TRADE
ACT OF KOREA art. 2(5). In Japan, whose legal system is very similar to that of South
Korea's, officers are not recognized as an intra-corporate organ. Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate
Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2117 (2001).
20. See Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 34.
21. Some preliminary points should be noted. First, South Korea has not yet
established an official translation system of cases. Citations to South Korean judicial
decisions do not reveal any party to a case. This Essay cites a case in the following
order: the name of the deciding court, the exact date of the decision, and the docket
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I examines the power and rights of shareholders. Section II
provides a statutory understanding of the role and functions of
directors in corporate governance in the United States and
South Korea. Finally, Section III describes the unique features
of statutory auditors and audit committees that are not found in
U.S. corporate governance but are found in South Korean corpo-
rate governance.
I. GOVERNANCE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
A. AN OVERVIEW
In the United States, a corporation "shall be managed by or
under the direction of' the board of directors.22 As the ultimate
owners of the corporation, however, shareholders have the big-
gest stake in the management of corporate affairs. Sharehold
ers have the ultimate decision-making authority in U.S. corpo-
rations,24 which they exercise at an annual general meeting.25
At the meeting, shareholders have the right to elect directors
and remove or refuse to re-elect directors that have engaged inS 21
mismanagement, misconduct, or self-dealing; this is a means of
27disciplining directors. Additionally, shareholders ask ques-
number. An example of such citation is "South Korean Supreme Court Decision of
December 21, 1999, 99 Da 137." Second, the won is the official monetary unit used in
South Korea. In this Essay, won amounts are not converted into dollar amounts. It
is reasonable to assume that 1,250 won has the same value of one U.S. dollar.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974).
23. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23, 26 (1991); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440 (2001).
24. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 440 (stating that "ultimate con-
trol over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class"); Macey, supra note
23, at 26 (noting that "shareholders retain the ultimate authority to control the cor-
poration because they have the biggest stake in the outcome of corporate decision-
making").
25. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.01(a) (1984).
26. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.21(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(b).
27. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 531 (1990) (stating that the reason for the significance of the right of share-
holders to elect directors is because "[ellecting good directors is especially important
for diversified institutions, who can't watch any one company closely and probably
aren't competent to do so anyway"); Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the
Market for Corporate Control, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 763 (1992) (opining that "by
nominating and electing a slate of directors that supports their position, sharehold-
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tions, express their views, and vote,28 theoretically making the
general meeting the supreme body of authority in a corpora-
tion.29
Under the South Korean Commercial Code, shareholders
are the corporation's residual claimants, whose interests are su-
perior to all others. ° Within the limits of the law and the arti-
cles of incorporation, all powers and various rights related to
controlling the corporation lie with the shareholders.3' Share-
holders exercise power through a general meeting, which must
be held at least once a year.32 General shareholder meetings for
South Korean corporations closely resemble their U.S. counter-
parts, in that shareholders may vote, gain information, and re-
move directors that have engaged in misconduct.33
B. VOTING RULES
Both in the United States and South Korea, shareholders
are in a statutory position to be involved in the control of the
corporation. One of the primary vehicles for shareholders to
participate in corporate governance is via their right to vote.34
Because this right is an essential part of share ownership, it
cannot be restricted without a change in the law.35 The voting
power of common shareholders is usually directly proportional
to the percentage of their capital contribution.36 In principle, the
corporate law of both countries intends that majority rule shall
govern the voting scheme and, thus, the minority shareholders
are bound by the will of the majority.37
ers may attempt to force the corporation to adopt an alternative business plan").
28. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 323-25 (1997).
29. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 491 (stating that the shareholder
meeting is a forum of owners of a corporation).
30. See COM. CODE art. 538 (S. Korea).
31. Cf. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 69 (1995) (declaring that
"[iun principle, the law is intended to give shareholders a significant amount of con-
trol").
32. COM. CODE art. 365 (S. Korea).
33. Id. at arts. 369, 385.
34. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Pol-
icy Towards Proxy Context, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1990) (viewing voting rights
of shareholders as "a major element in the structure of corporate law").
35. Id.
36. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390 (1986) (stating that "voting rights
should be proportional to one's share of the residual interest in the firm").
37. See, e.g., Catherine Habermehl & David R. Koepsell, United States, in
PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 259, 262 (Matthias W. Stecher ed., 1997)
(stating that "[miajority mandate remains the norm in corporate governance"); 1 F.
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U.S. corporate law provides various shareholder voting
rules. In the United States, the right to vote can be exercised in
31person or by proxy. Shareholders may also participate by
means of "remote communication," which includes writing, tele-
phone, and internet. 9 Both voting by proxy and remote com-
munication allows physically absent shareholders to participate
in the shareholders' general meeting. 0 The articles of incorpo-
ration, or when the articles do not specify, the board of directors,
determine how the shareholders shall vote.41
Under U.S. corporate law, corporate voting usually takes
place on a "one share, one vote" basis,42 which is the universally
accepted rule in corporate governance.43 In addition to this rule,
in some states, such as Delaware, shareholders are allowed to
cumulate their votes to elect directors if the articles of incorpo-
ration specifically provide for cumulative voting. 4  In other
states, cumulative voting is mandatory in an election of direc-
tors.4" Generally, shareholders do not need to request cumula-
HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS: PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER
INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that "holders of a majority
of the shares with voting power control the corporation").
38. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.22(a) (1984).
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a) (1974); Michael P. Dooley & Mi-
chael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act
and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 737, 756-58, 766 n.100
(2001).
40. Dooley & Goldman, supra note 39, at 756-58.
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a).
42. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting
Common Shares - Their History, Legality and Validity, 15 SEC. REG. J. 37, 48-50
(1987) (providing the history of "one share, one vote" standard); Henry G. Manne,
The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 407
(1962) (observing that the rule of one-share-one-vote is almost as old as the corpora-
tion itself).
43. See, e.g., Jose W. Fernandez et al., Corporate Caveat Emptor: Minority
Shareholder Rights in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina, 32 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 157, 165, 177, 188, 201, 210 (2001) (discussing the rule of "one-
share-one-vote" in some Latin American jurisdictions); Yuwa Wei, Seeking a Practi-
cable Chinese Model of Corporate Governance, 10 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 393, 402
(2001) (stating that "[t]he principle of one vote per share is firmly established" in
China).
44. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214. Cumulative voting, unlike the one
share one vote rule, does not require a shareholder to vote only one vote per share
for a director. If a number of directors are up for election, the shareholder may com-
bine these votes and use all of these combined votes to vote for a single director or
may allocate these votes among the candidates. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES &
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 597 (5th ed. 2000).
45. The six states that have mandatory cumulative voting are Arizona, Ken-
tucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia. CHOPER ET AL.,
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tive voting unless so specified by the articles of incorporation. 46
Similarly, shareholders under South Korean law may exer-
cise their right to vote either in person or by proxy at the gen-
eral meeting.47 They may execute their votes in writing in lieu
of actually attending the meeting, as provided in the articles of
incorporation. 48 This allows shareholders to express their views
with substantial ease.4 9
In South Korea, each common shareholder is traditionally
entitled to have one vote for each share.50 The exception to this
rule occurs when shareholders elect directors.5' In the case
where two or more directors are to be elected at the general
meeting, shareholders who hold at least three percent of the to-
tal outstanding voting shares may request the implementation
of cumulative voting, except as otherwise provided by the arti-
cles of incorporation. 2 Cumulative voting increases the possibil-
ity of minority representation on the board of directors. 3
C. MAJORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SHAREHOLDERS' RESOLUTIONS
Shareholders are entrusted with all powers which have not
been conferred either to the board of directors or to other intra-
corporate bodies. 4 Under the statutory scheme of the United
States and South Korea, there are many matters that require
shareholder approval.5 This statutory requirement prevents
the board of directors from depriving shareholders of their
supra note 44, at 600.
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214.
47. COM. CODE art. 368(3) (S. Korea).
48. Id. at art. 368-3(1).
49. Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their
Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 295 (2000)
(stating that absentee voting makes it "substantially easier for shareholders to exer-
cise their rights") [hereinafter J. Kim].
50. COM. CODE art. 369(1) (S. Korea).
51. Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 55.
52. COM. CODE art. 382-2 (S. Korea).
53. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reiner Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (1996) (stating that cumulative voting
"empowers large minority shareholders to select directors"); Whitney Campbell, The
Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. LAw. 3, 5-6 (1955).
54. In the United States, a majority of states have statutory provisions permit-
ting the articles of incorporation to restrict the powers of the board and expand
those of the shareholders. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 300(a) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW §§ 620(b)-(c) (1986).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see infra notes 62-77 and accom-
panying text.
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rights for the sole benefit of directors or in a manner detrimen-
tal to the shareholders.56
State corporate law in the United States require sharehold-
ers to approve some matters. For example, an amendment of
the articles of incorporation or bylaws is subject to shareholder
approval." Other matters that require shareholder approval
may be set forth in the articles of incorporation. 5' Statutes in
the United States require a quorum of shareholders, consisting
of as few as one-third of the shareholders, to vote.5 9 Of this quo-
rum, most state statutes only require majority approval to adopt
a resolution.6' There are a few states, however, that have en-
acted statutes requiring a supermajority for resolutions effect-
ing a "fundamental change" in the absence of a contrary provi-
sion in the articles of incorporation.6
Under the South Korean Commercial Code, shareholders
can adopt three kinds of binding resolutions."' First, except as
otherwise provided in the South Korean Commercial Code or set
forth in the articles of incorporation, the majority of sharehold-
ers present at the general shareholder meeting and at least one-
fourth of the total outstanding shares must approve the adop-
tion of ordinary resolutions.6' Ordinary resolutions usually ad-
dress such matters as the election of directors and statutory
auditors,64 remuneration for directors and statutory auditors,65
approval of financial statements,66 approval of dividends,67 and
approval of a plan of liquidation.5
The second type of resolution is a special resolution, which
56. See Letsou, supra note 27, at 765.
57. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03, 10.20(b); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 109.
58. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a).
59. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 551. The Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act requires one-half of shareholders to be present to constitute a quorum.
REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.25. The articles of incorporation cannot require a
quorum of less than one-third of shareholders, but the default is a quorum of one-
half of shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1974).
60. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.25 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 216 (1974); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 551.
61. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20 (1993) (requiring a supermajority for
merger, consolidation, and exchange); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 551.
62. See COM. CODE arts. 368(1), 400, 434, 604(1) (S. Korea).
63. Id. at art. 368(1).
64. Id. at arts. 382(1), 409.
65. Id. at arts. 388, 415.
66. Id. at art. 449(1).
67. Id. at arts. 447, 447-2, 449.
68. COM. CODE art. 540 (S. Korea).
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requires the approval of no less than two-thirds of the share-
holders present at the general meeting and at least one-third of
the total outstanding shares.69 The voting requirement for this
kind of resolution cannot be altered or eliminated by the articles
70
of incorporation. Matters of vital importance to the corpora-
tion require special resolutions.71 Typical examples of such reso-
lutions are amendment of the articles of incorporation; 72 reduc-
tion of capital;73 and merger, consolidation, continuance, or
dissolution of the corporation.
7 4
Finally, the unanimous consent of all shareholders is neces-
sary for the release of promoters, directors, or statutory auditors
from their liability to the corporation. 5 Unanimous consent is
also needed to change the corporate structure from a chusik
hoesa into a yuhan hoesa,75 which resembles a U.S. limited li-
77
ability company.
D. QUALIFIED MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
The protections available to minority shareholders under
U.S. law include "investment rights, profit rights, corporate af-
fairs rights, shareholder agreements, and derivative actions, all
of which were created either as a means of protection or as a
corporate weapon. These rights enable shareholders to advance
their interests in a corporation."7 8  Any one shareholder may
bring a derivative suit against officers, directors, or sharehold-
ers that have committed a wrong against the corporation, so
long as that shareholder was holding shares at the time of the
69. Id. at art. 434.
70. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 354.
71. Id.
72. COM. CODE arts. 433-434 (S. Korea).
73. Id. at art. 438.
74. Id. at arts. 518-19, 522.
75. Id. at arts. 324, 400, 415.
76. The yuhan hoesa is officially translated into "limited liability corporation"
under the South Korean Commercial Code. It is defined as a hybrid corporation that
has characteristics of both the chusik hoesa and the hapmyong hoesa. However, it is
closer to the former than the latter and is thus regarded as a miniature of the chusik
hoesa. The hapmyong hoesa bears resemblance to the modern U.S. general partner-
ship, although it is a kind of a corporate entity enjoying the status of a legal person.
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 855, 858 (Sang Hyun Song
ed., 1983) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION].
77. Id.
78. Julian J. Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority
Shareholders - A Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 636 (2000).
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wrongdoing." Under state statute, a single shareholder may
also apply for judicial dissolution of a corporation.8 Further-
more, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act authorizes
shareholders who own at least ten percent of the outstanding
shares to call a special meeting and have their issues considered
at that meeting.81 Some states, such as Delaware, however,
leave this issue to be determined by the articles of incorpora-
tion.82 Mandatory cumulative voting, available in some states,
is another means of protecting minority shareholders.83 Stat-
utes further protect minority shareholders who have utilized
cumulative voting to elect a director, by requiring that cumula-
tive voting be used to remove a director when it was used to
elect that director.84
Similarly, the South Korean Commercial Code grants spe-
cial rights to qualified minority shareholders to protect their in-
terests. As a safeguard against abuses by minority sharehold-
ers, however, the South Korean Commercial Code provides that
minimum holding requirements should be satisfied to be classi-
fied as "qualified" and to exercise various shareholder rights.8 5
In other words, some kinds of minority rights are available only
to shareholders who have a specified minimum percentage of
outstanding voting shares.86 Any shareholder owning at least
three percent of the outstanding voting shares usually has the
right to demand the convocation of an extraordinary general
meeting of shareholders,"7 request the corporation to adopt cu-
mulative voting for director election,88 and put matters on the
agenda of the shareholders' meeting." Shareholders holding one
percent or more of the issued and outstanding voting shares are
vested with the right to demand that directors halt an act con-
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 325, 327 (1974); see discussion infra I.G.
80. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (1984). See generally
Habermehl & Koepsell, supra note 37.
81. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.02(a). See generally Habermehl & Koep-
sell, supra note 37.
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d).
83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84. See generally CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 599 (citing N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 706(c) (1963)).
85. J. Kim, supra note 49, at 282.
86. See generally Boong-Kyu Lee, Note, Don Quixote or Robin Hood?: Minority
Shareholder Rights and Corporate Governance in Korea, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 345
(2002).
87. COM. CODE art. 366(1) (S. Korea).
88. Id. at art. 382-2.
89. Id. at art. 363-2(1).
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templated in violation of either the law or the articles of incor-
poration" and to bring a derivative suit against the directors,9'
statutory auditors,92 or audit committee members.93 Finally, a
shareholder who represents at least one-tenth of the corpora-
tion's capital is qualified to apply to the court for the dissolution
of the corporation when it is necessary.94
E. ACCESS TO CORPORATE INFORMATION
Information is a prerequisite to the effective exercise of
shareholder rights. That is to say, without sufficient and good
information, a shareholder can hardly be expected to vote intel-
ligently, uncover managerial misconduct, or bring an action• • 95
against corporate insiders. One of the legal devices used to ob-
tain information about the corporation's affairs is the right of
inspection, found in both U.S. and South Korean law. 96
In the United States, unless state law provides otherwise,
any shareholder may inspect corporate books and records if he
acts in good faith and for a "proper purpose."9 7 Some states,
though, have specific limitations on the ability of shareholders
to inspect corporate documents. 98 For example, the state of New
York permits the inspection of corporate books and documents
by any shareholder who has held his shares for at least six
months preceding the demand or to any shareholder who owns
no less than five percent of all outstanding shares. 9
Generally there are two types of statutory provisions re-
garding information access."' The first is promulgated by the
90. Id. at art. 402.
91. Id. at art. 403(1).
92. Id. at art. 415.
93. COM. CODE art. 415-2(6) (S. Korea).
94. Id. at art. 520(1). A dissolution of the corporation is necessary to bring a
deadlock between majority and minority shareholders to an end. Id. It is also re-
quired when the company's existence is placed in danger by improper managing or
disposing of the company's assets. Id.
95. Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring and Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331,
332-33 (1996) (noting that "[a] shareholder seeking to uncover corporate misman-
agement or fraud may need access to the company's internal files").
96. COM. CODE art. 466 (S. Korea); CLARK, supra note 36, at 96-97; Manne, su-
pra note 42, at 408.
97. See generally Fred S. McChesney, "Proper Purpose," Fiduciary Duties, and
Shareholder-Raider Access to Corporate Information, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199 (2000).
98. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(b) (1986).
99. Id.
100. See McChesney, supra note 97, at 1202-05 (discussing how the two types of
statutes work the same in practice).
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Model Business Corporation Act, which requires that certain
general information be provided to shareholders if they comply
with procedural requirements, most notably a notice require-
ment.' °' Shareholders must demonstrate a "proper purpose" in
order to obtain access to any other information. 102 The second
type of statutory provision is similar to the one found in Dela-
ware, where shareholders are not entitled to any information
without demonstrating a "proper purpose," but upon this show-
ing, they have complete access to sensitive information, such as
lists of stockholders and business records. 103 If the shareholder
complies with all the procedural requirements and requests ac-
cess to the stock ledger or a list of shareholders, the burden
shifts to the corporation to prove that the request is made for an
improper purpose.
0 4
Similarly, shareholders have the right to inspect corporate
books and records under the South Korean Commercial Code.
Every shareholder has, irrespective of the extent of his holdings,
a statutory right to inspect and copy financial statements, busi-
ness reports, and the audit report kept at the principal office of
the corporation. 0 6 However, corporations do not like to let their
owners know much about their affairs because the production of
information imposes costs on the corporation.' Also, secrecy is
necessary to protect sensitive corporate information from disclo-
sure and potential abuses by shareholders. 0 s Therefore, the
right to gain access to more sensitive materials, such as ac-
counting books and documents, is granted only to shareholders
who own three percent or more of the total outstanding
shares. °9
101. Id. at 1202 (citing MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.01(e) (1974)); see also REV.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 16.01, 16.02(a) (1984).
102. McChesney, supra note 97, at 1202 (citing MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
16.02(c)(1) (1974)); see also REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (b)-(c) (requiring a
showing of good faith and that the "proper purpose" be connected to the records that
the shareholder requests).
103. McChesney, supra note 97, at 1202 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)
(1974)).
104. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c).
105. 1 Ju-CHAN SONN, SANGBOB [COMMERCIAL LAw] 989 (13th ed. 2002).
106. COM. CODE art. 448 (S. Korea) (cross-referencing arts. 447, 447-2, and 447-
4).
107. McChesney, supra note 97, at 1207 (stating that "information is costly to
produce").
108. COX ET AL., supra note 28, at 307-09.
109. COM. CODE art. 466(1) (S. Korea). The rationale for this rule is that if any
shareholder of ABC corporation, irrespective of how many shares the person owns, is
allowed to gain corporate information obtained from the accounting books of ABC
[Vo1.12:2
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Moreover, inspection may justifiably be denied in South Ko-
rea if the demand for such inspection is improper. ° The corpo-
ration may refuse to allow inspection if there are grounds to be-
lieve that shareholders will use the information acquired in a
manner that is not related to the business activities of the cor-
poration and would be detrimental to its interests."' Because of
the legal presumption that a demand is proper, the burden of
establishing that the demand for inspection is improper falls on
the corporation. 112 Should the inspection be inappropriately re-
fused, shareholders can seek a court order to gain access to the
information."3 This is referred to as the "proper demand" re-
quirement, the functions of which, at least theoretically, parallel
those of the "proper purpose" requirement under U.S. law. 114
F. PARTICIPATION IN CAPITAL INCREASES
Using the exclusive authority of the board of directors to is-
sue additional shares could cause an unfair dilution of an indi-
vidual shareholder's voting power and an unfair reduction of an
individual shareholder's proportionate interest in dividends and
corporate assets. '  Such danger may be offset by the preemp-
tive right, which is defined as a right to participate in capital in-
creases in advance of all others, on specified terms.1 6 This right
was originally created as a means for maintaining the individ-
ual shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation'1 7 and
has become "recognized so universally as to have become axio-
matic in corporation law.""'
In the United States, the preemptive right is sometimes re-
corporation, DEF corporation, which competes with ABC corporation, will have the
ability to get the corporate information of ABC corporation with ease whenever the
corporation buys only one share of ABC corporation.
110. Id. at art. 466(2).
111. J. Kim, supra note 49, at 289.
112. COM. CODE art. 466(2) (S. Korea).
113. South Korean Supreme Court Decision of December 21, 1999, 99 Da 137.
114. Wi-Du Kang, Hanguk Sangbobe Itseoseoui Yongmi Hoesabobui Gyesue
Gwanhan Yongu [Influence of the Anglo-American Legal Traditions on the Korean
Commercial Law] 101-02 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dong-A Univer-
sity, South Korea) (on file with author).
115. Alexander H. Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563,
569-74 (1929).
116. Kerry S. Burke, Regulating Corporate Governance Through the Market:
Comparing the Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom,
27 J. CORP. L. 341, 358 (2002).
117. Frey, supra note 115, at 563-64.
118. Fuller v. Krogh, 113 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Wis. 1962).
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served for shareholders in connection with capital increases." 9
The preemptive right allows for the subscription of a pro rata
portion of the additionally issued shares to current sharehold-
ers, thus preventing a dilution of the percentage of share owner-
ship. 120 In the United States, many state corporate statutes fol-
low the "opt-in" model.' 2 ' For example, the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act provides that "[t]he shareholders of a
corporation do not have a preemptive right to acquire the corpo-
ration's unissued shares except to the extent the articles of in-
corporation so provide."2 In sharp contrast to this trend, some
states have adopted an "opt-out" scheme. 123 For example, under
New York corporate law, shareholders are deemed to have the
preemptive right unless the articles of incorporation have a pro-
vision expressly denying it. 1
24
Likewise, the South Korean Commercial Code contains pro-
visions designed to ensure that every shareholder has the right
of preemption over new issues of shares.125 In the case of capital
increases, therefore, the existing shareholders have a preferen-
tial right to subscribe to newly issued shares in the amount pro-
portional to the number of their current shares. However, this
right is not absolute as the articles of incorporation may impose
some restrictions on this right. 2 1 Under South Korean law, it is
also lawful for a corporation to allot preemptive rights to par-
ticular third persons such as past or present employees and offi-
128
cers.
G. PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECTOR WRONGDOINGS
In the United States, a shareholder may bring an action di-
rectly against the corporation or corporate insiders on his own
behalf for injury inflicted upon him.129 This action is called a di-
119. CLARK, supra note 36, at 719. Abolished in most public corporations, how-
ever, the preemptive right draws attention only from some close corporations,
"where [it] can serve both to protect some shareholders against unwanted changes in
the balance of power and to frustrate those who think a change is needed." Id.
120. Frey, supra note 115, at 563-64.
121. COX ET AL., supra note 28, at 474; MOYE, supra note 5, at 214.
122. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (1984).
123. COX ET AL., supra note 28, at 474; MOYE, supra note 5, at 214.
124. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 622(b)-(c) (1986).
125. COM. CODE art. 418(1) (S. Korea).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at art. 420(5).
129. HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 333 (rev. ed. 1946);
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rect suit.' 30 Typical examples of a direct suit are actions to en-
force an individual shareholder's voting rights or to recover or
compel the payment of dividends. 13  In the United States, a mi-
nority shareholder is also entitled to bring a derivative suit,
which is defined as a suit brought by the minority shareholder
on behalf of the corporation to enforce the liability of the direc-
tors.132 This suit is regarded as a method of deterring wrongdo-
ings by corporate insiders and holding corporate insiders, par-
ticularly directors, accountable for harm to the corporation. 1
3
The United States applies the contemporaneous ownership rule,
under which the plaintiff must have held shares at the time of
the act complained of by him in order to bring suit.' Therefore,
in the United States, every single shareholder can initiate a de-
rivative suit.
135
Before a shareholder may proceed with a derivative suit,
however, adequate demand must be made of the directors to
bring suit on behalf of the corporation, unless such demand
would be futile.136  Jurisdictions have taken two different ap-
proaches in determining whether demand is futile: the Dela-
ware approach and the Universal Demand approach.'37 Dela-
ware's two prong test establishes that demand is not futile if:
"(1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid ex-
see, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 470 (Cal. 1969) (distinguish-
ing direct suits from derivative suits).
130. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 1013.
131. Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 51-52.
132. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 804.
133. Id. (observing that "the derivative suit is considered to be an important re-
medial and deterrent device to police and prevent management abuses and to pro-
tect minority shareholders and others concerned with the welfare of the corpora-
tion").
134. The contemporaneous ownership rule is recognized in federal and most
state courts of the United States. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1; REv. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 7.41(1) (1984); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 327 (1974).
135. See 2 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02 (1994). The term "derivative suit" is therefore defined as
an action brought by one or more individual shareholders in the name of and on be-
half of the corporation against any particular party or parties who have injured the
corporation. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1.01 (1987). This suit is equitable in nature. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 811 (Del. 1984).
136. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996) (citing N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 626 (1986)).
137. Id.
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ercise of business judgment."'38 Under the Universal Demand
approach, however, demand would have to be made regardless
of whether the demand would be futile, unless it would cause
"irreparable injury" in some cases.139 The Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act further requires that ninety days pass
from the time of notice until the filing of suit unless such time
would result in irreparable harm to the corporation or the direc-
tors reject the demand. 4 ° Other states only require that thirty
days pass from the date of demand before a suit may be filed.''
Most U.S. jurisdictions also have a security-for-expenses
provision whereby the shareholder-plaintiffs are required to
post security for the anticipated amount of the defendants' ex-
penses.' 4' Some states only require that security be posted when
the shareholders bringing the suit own a small percentage of the
total shares of the corporation.4 3 For example, New York re-
quires that shareholders have at least five percent of the total
shares in order to avoid posting security.' Others jurisdictions
allow courts to award expenses upon dismissal of the suit, if the
suit is found to be "without reasonable cause or for an improper
purpose."45
In a derivative suit, the corporation receives the damages
rather than the individual shareholders themselves. This is
because a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the corporation
and the corporation is the entity that is alleging harm.147 Never-
theless, the shareholder-plaintiff is awarded his expenses in
bringing the suit.
48
Under South Korean law, a minority shareholder may bring
138. Id. (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814).
139. Id. at 125 (citing MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42(1) (1974) (stating that uni-
versal demand must be made)); 2 A.L.I., supra note 135, § 7.03(b), at 53-54 (1992)
(stating that universal demand is required unless demand would cause "irreparable
injury to the corporation").
140. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1984).
141. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (1990) (providing that defendant may
make a motion for bond if there will be no benefit to the corporation or the share-
holders).
142. See, e.g., id.
143. DEMOTT, supra note 135, §§ 3.01-3.02.
144. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (1986).
145. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.46(2).
146. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 804; see N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(e)
(stating "the court may award the plaintiff.., reasonable expenses, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, and shall direct him or them to account to the corporation
for the remainder of the proceeds so received by him or them").
147. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 804.
148. Id.; see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(e).
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a direct suit against the corporation or its directors. Also, the
shareholders may bring a derivative suit under the South Ko-
rean Commercial Code, which is very similar to U.S. law.
49
However, the requirements for bringing and maintaining a de-
rivative suit under the South Korean Commercial Code are dif-
ferent from U.S. requirements. In South Korea, only sharehold-
ers with at least one percent of the total outstanding shares can
initiate a derivative suit.'50 Moreover, South Korean law does
not require the plaintiff to be a shareholder at the time of the
act complained of by him."
According to the South Korean Commercial Code, the quali-
fied shareholder, before asserting a claim on the corporation's
behalf, must first attempt to secure the desired action against
the directors from the corporation itself.152 If the corporation
has failed to file an action within thirty days from the date of
the receipt of the demand, the shareholder may immediately file
such action on behalf of the corporation. However, if irrepara-
ble damage may be caused to the corporation with the lapse of
the thirty-day grace period allotted for a corporate response, the
shareholder may immediately file such action.
5 4
The so-called "security-for-expenses" provisions can also be
found in the South Korean Commercial Code. 1 5 The purposes of
security-for-expenses provisions are: (1) to discourage "strike
suits," which are actions brought not to obtain recovery for the
corporation but only to secure a nuisance value settlement,
5 6
and (2) to make it easier for directors to recover damages from
shareholders if they win the suit.15' Thus, if the director-
defendant renders it credible that the action brought against
him has a wrongful purpose, the court may order the share-
holder-plaintiff to post security.5 8
149. Compare COM. CODE art. 403 (S. Korea), with REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 7.40.
150. COM. CODE art. 403(1) (S. Korea).
151. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 468.
152. COM. CODE art. 403(1) (S. Korea).
153. Id. at art. 403(3).
154. Id. at art. 403(4).
155. Id. at art. 403.
156. DEMOTT, supra note 135, § 3.01. For a more detailed account of strike suit,
see William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord III, Towards a Relaxed Summary
Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A New Weapon Against
"Strike"Suits, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 924-28 (1990).
157. KIUON TSCHE, SIN HOESABOBRON [NEw TREATISE ON CORPORATE LAw] 642
(10th ed. 2000).
158. COM. CODE arts. 176(3)-(4), 403(7) (S. Korea).
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Like in the United States, any recovery by a shareholder
accrues not to the shareholder but to the corporation under
South Korean law.159 The corporation receives damages because,
in a derivative suit, the shareholder's right to sue derives from
his ownership. 6 0 In order to compensate the shareholder plain-
tiff, though, the shareholder-plaintiff is entitled to a sum suffi-
cient to cover his legal expenses from the corporation. 1
6 1
H. APPRAISAL REMEDY
In the United States, most states allow shareholders to
have an appraisal right under the law.'6 ' This right is defined
as the right to demand payment of the "fair value" or "fair mar-
ket value" of shares owned by shareholders when they have dis-
sented from a proposed merger, acquisition, or other corporate
change.' 63 Nevertheless, in the United States, there are states,
such as California and Delaware, where appraisal rights are not
available to shareholders of a publicly traded corporation in a
stock-for-stock merger.'
Similarly, the South Korean Commercial Code grants
shareholders the right to an appraisal.16' This right enables
shareholders to divest at a fair price.166 It also protects share-
holders against involuntary investment in a successor corpora-
tion and against other unfair treatment.'67
II. GOVERNANCE ROLE OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
A. AN OVERVIEW
The U.S. notion of the board as the supreme authority in
the management of a corporation was first introduced into the
159. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J.
LEGAL STuD. 351, 354 (2001) (explaining derivative-suit mechanics).
160. Id.
161. COM. CODE art. 405(1) (S. Korea).
162. Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
829, 831-32 (1984); see, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (1984).
163. Seligman, supra note 162, at 833-35.
164. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300(b)(1) (1990); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §
262(b)(1) (1974).
165. COM. CODE arts. 335-2, 335-6, 374-2, 522-3, 530-11 (S. Korea).
166. See K. Kim, supra note 19, at 166.
167. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 358.
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South Korean Commercial Code of 1962."6 Before the enact-
ment of the Commercial Code, the general meeting of share-
holders was the forum where unlimited power existed. 69 Direc-
tors were mere servants of the shareholders.
Now directors serve as members of the board of directors.
In the statutory schemes of the United States and South Korea,
the board is the original and supreme authority in matters of
regular business management.170 The board of directors has the
duty to "supervise the performance of duties by the directors."
The rights and power of the board of directors to manage a cor-
poration is a common feature both in the United States and
South Korea.
72
B. NUMBER AND QUALIFICATIONS OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Historically, nearly all state statutes in the United States
required a corporation to have three or more directors, but that
is now rare.'73 For example, both Delaware law and the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act provide that a board may con-
sist of one or more members. 74 The number of directors of a
corporation is usually specified either in the articles of incorpo-
ration or in the bylaws.
171
In the United States, only "individuals" may serve as direc-
tors. 76  Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide
otherwise, shareholders elect or appoint persons as directors,
regardless of whether the appointees are shareholders of the
corporation or residents of the state of incorporation. 77 Other
168. Hyun Yoo, To Form a Stock Corporation in Korea: A Comparative Study
with American Law, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA 317, 323 (Chan-Jin Kim ed., 2d ed.
1988).
169. Id.
170. Id. In the United States, Californian commentators state that "[a] corpora-
tion requires some form of government, as does any entity composed of individuals.
The government of a corporation is generally entrusted to a board of directors of the
elected representatives of shareholders." 1 HAROLD MARSH, JR. & R. RoY FINKLE,
MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAw § 9.1 (3d ed. 1990).
171. COM. CODE art. 393(2) (S. Korea).
172. COX ET AL., supra note 28, at 154; CHUNG, supra note 18, at 400.
173. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(a) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(b) (1974). See generally E. George Rudolph, Further Thoughts on the One
and Two Director Statutes, 20 Bus. LAw. 781 (1965).
174. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b).
175. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 552.
176. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(a). By allowing only individu-
als to serve as directors, the statute intentionally disqualifies corporations or other
entities from serving as directors. See id.
177. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.02.
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qualifications for directors may be prescribed in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws. 178 The term of office of a director usu-
ally runs until the next annual meeting, unless the board is
classified.17 Like the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
many corporate statutes allow for a classified board of directors,
so that the terms of directors are staggered, although each di-
rector still serves the same number of years.80
In South Korea, a chusik hoesa must have at least three di-
rectors who are appointed at a general meeting of the share-
holders by a common or ordinary resolution."" However, in the
case of a company with total capital of less than five hundred
million won, the number of the directors may be one or two.
82
Either straight or cumulative voting may be employed in elect-
ing directors; it is dependent upon the articles of incorporation
of the individual corporation.
l 3
Unlike in the United States, there is no provision that only
natural persons should be directors in South Korea. The aca-
demic view, however, is unsettled on whether a legal person
such as a corporation is eligible to be a director under the South
Korean Commercial Code.' 4 Moreover, the South Korean
Commercial Code does not have any provision that requires cor-
178. See, e.g., McKee & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1967)
(upholding bylaws requiring qualifications for directors).
179. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.05(b).
180. See, e.g., id. § 8.06; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1974).
181. COM. CODE arts. 382(1), 383(1) (S. Korea).
182. Id. at art. 383(1).
183. See id. at art. 382-2.
184. At one extreme, some law professors have argued that as long as a legal
person is a fiction created by law and a representative director selected among direc-
tors should be a natural person in terms of the nature of his responsibility under
South Korean law, a legal person cannot be engaged in the management of the cor-
poration and the supervision of directors. See, e.g., CHOL-SONG LEE, HOESABOB
KANGEUI [LECTURES ON CORPORATE LAW] 510 (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter C. LEE]; 1
KIUON TSCHE, SANGBOBHAK SINRON [NEW TREATISE ON THE COMMERCIAL LAW] 769-
70 (13th ed. 2001). However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the time-
honored prevailing view that a legal person can serve as a promoter. Furthermore,
article 95 of the South Korean Corporate Reorganization Act allows any trust bank
or other kinds of bank to be appointed as a trustee. At the other extreme, several
commentators have concluded that a legal person can be elected as a director with-
out difficulty. The rationale for this view is that a legal person such as a corporation
usually has more financial resources than a natural person. See, e.g., CHUNG, supra
note 18, at 387. An intermediate position is to divide the directors into managing
directors and non-managing directors and then to explain that a legal person be-
cause of its artificiality is qualified to be only a non-managing director. See, e.g.,
SONN, supra note 105, at 810.
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porate directors to be South Korean citizens or residents.."'
Nevertheless, the articles of incorporation may require that di-
rectors be selected from among the shareholders. 18 6 The South
Korean Commercial Code also provides that a director cannot
concurrently hold the office of a statutory auditor within a cor-
• 187
poration.
Furthermore, corporate directors may serve no more than
three years under the South Korean Commercial Code.' 8 This
does not, however, prevent re-appointment.8 9 The articles of in-
corporation may also extend a director's term to the close of the
general shareholder meeting held for the purpose of the settle-
ment of accounts comprised in the director's term. 90
C. REMOVAL OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
In the United States, most states allow removal of directors
with or without cause by a vote of the shareholders. 191 Through
the articles of incorporation, however, the shareholders' power
of removal may be limited to removal for cause.192 Nevertheless,
U.S. directors can claim damages upon early removal for a
breach of contract between them and the corporation.' In the
United States, a court also may have the power of removal for
cause, specified in the state statutes, upon petition of a director
or a designated percentage of the shareholders.9 The court
may bar a director removed by court action from re-election in-
definitely or for a period to be determined by the court.9 Addi-
tionally, the court may also issue a preliminary injunction, upon
the motion of the petitioning shareholders or directors, enjoining
185. See generally COM. CODE (S. Korea).
186. COM. CODE art. 387 (S. Korea).
187. Id. at art. 411.
188. Id. at art. 383(2).
189. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 388.
190. COM. CODE art. 383(3) (S. Korea).
191. Under some state statutes, the board is permitted to remove a director for
cause or specified reasons, among which the statute expressly includes conviction of
a felony. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (1984); CAL. CORP. CODE §
302 (1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 51(c) (1996); Everett v. Transnation Dev.
Corp., 267 A.2d 627 (Del. Ch. 1970) (identifying shareholders' power to remove direc-
tors without cause).
192. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a).
193. See, e.g., Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 224 N.W. 623, 624 (Mich. 1929); Nelson
v. Pioneer Specialties, Inc., 325 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
194. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.09.
195. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 706(d) (1986).
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a director from engaging in misconduct. 196
Under the South Korean Commercial Code, shareholders
may remove directors at any time by a special resolution at their
general meeting. 197 Directors who have been removed before
their set terms expire without due cause are entitled to claim
damages caused by their removal from the corporation. If
shareholders at the general meeting refuse to remove directors
who have engaged in dishonest conduct, violated laws, or vio-
lated the articles of incorporation, any shareholder who holds
three percent of all the outstanding shares of the corporation
may demand that a court remove them within one month after
the date of such a resolution.' 99 Finally, shareholders may also
petition the court under Article 407(1) of the South Korean
Commercial Code to remove directors or representative directors
because of discord between the directors and shareholders. °0
D. FILLING OF VACANCIES IN THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
State corporate law statutes in the United States vary
somewhat in their treatment of board vacancies. Roughly
speaking, if any vacancy occurs on the board, it may be filled ei-
ther by the shareholders or by the board, unless the articles of
incorporation provide otherwise.2°' Moreover, the newly elected
director has the same authority as that of a regular or normal
director. °2
Upon petition, a court may also appoint a provisional direc-
tor under limited circumstances, notwithstanding the articles of
incorporation. 20' These circumstances include instances where
there is a deadlock of a board that has an even number of mem-
bers and the result could cause harm to the corporation, the di-
196. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1227 (Del. 1998). "A plain-
tiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate i) a reasonable probability of
success on the merits, and ii) that absent the injunction, some irreparable harm will
occur, which harm outweighs the harm defendants will suffer if the relief is
granted." Id. (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334,
1341 (Del. 1987)).
197. COM. CODE art. 385(1) (S. Korea).
198. Id.
199. Id. at art. 385(2).
200. Id. at art. 407(1).
201. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.10(a) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 142(e) (1974).
202. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (1974).
203. See Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-
Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in
Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 694 (1992).
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rectors have acted illegally or fraudulently, there is corporate
waste, or the shareholders are unable to elect successor direc-
tors.2 °4 A provisional director has the same powers and author-
ity as a permanent director.0 5
Under the South Korean Commercial Code, if the number of
directors drops below the number required by law or the articles
of incorporation, the remaining directors convene a general
meeting of shareholders to appoint a new director to fill the va-
cancy.2 6 If the end of tenure or the resignation of a director re-
sults in a vacancy, he continues to hold "the rights and duties as
a director until the newly elected director inaugurates office, if
the directors remaining in office would otherwise become fewer
than the minimum number provided by law or by the articles of
incorporation."2 7
South Korean law provides an alternative method of filling
a director vacancy through judicial appointment of a provisional
or temporary director.0 8 If it is deemed necessary, a court of
competent jurisdiction may "appoint a person [as a provisional
director] who is to temporarily perform the duties of a director,
upon application by a director, auditor, or any other interested
person."0 9 A provisional director wields authority to the same
extent as a regular director, unless the court imposes limita-
tions on his authority.210
As noted in the previous section, shareholders may resort to
Article 407(1) to remove a director.2 1' Article 407(1) further pro-
vides that where an action has been brought to nullify or revoke
a resolution by which a director has been appointed or to remove
a director, the court may, upon the application by the parties
concerned, suspend the exercise of the duties of such director by
204. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 308 (1990); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-55
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (1988).
205. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7.
206. COM. CODE art. 382(1) (S. Korea).
207. Id. at art. 386(1).
208. South Korean Supreme Court Decision of April 28, 1964, 63 Da 518; see
KOREAN Civ. CODE. art. 63 (providing that "[i]f a vacancy has occurred in the post of
directors or there is no director, and there is reason to believe that damage will ensue
therefrom, the court shall appoint a provisional director on the application of any person
interested or of a public prosecutor").
209. COM. CODE art. 386(2) (S. Korea). Employees and creditors are typical ex-
amples of "any other interested person."
210. South Korean Supreme Court Decisions of May 22, 1968,68 Ma 119. The same
procedure may be used for appointing a provisional representative director.
211. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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means of a provisional disposition 212 or may appoint an acting
director.21' The same provision is applicable in an emergency,
even before a principal action is instituted.214 Therefore, when
directors breach their duty of care and loyalty or disobey share-
holders, they might be forced out.
By a provisional disposition order, the director's power is
suspended or an acting director is appointed.2 5 An acting direc-
tor, unlike a provisional director, has only the power to carry out
those matters that arise within the ordinary course of business,
unless otherwise provided in the provisional disposition order.
21 6
Because the court appoints an acting director, only the court can
217terminate an acting director's authority.
E. POWERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND FORMALITIES FOR
ITS ACTION
Under both U.S. state law and South Korean law, the board
of directors may take action only by the vote of a majority of di-
rectors present at the meeting, not by individual action of the
directors.21 s Furthermore, there are many similarities between
U.S. and South Korean law with respect to the board's powers.
Under both U.S. and South Korean law, the board of directors is
responsible for managing the corporation and supervising the
212. Provisional disposition is a remedy similar to preliminary injunction under
U.S. law. Yoo, supra note 168, at 353.
213. COM. CODE art. 407(1) (S. Korea).
214. Id.
215. The South Korean Civil Execution Act has the detailed procedure concerning
provisional disposition. Its Article 300(2) states that "[pirovisional disposition may also
be granted for the purpose of setting a provisional state of affairs." CIV. EXECUTION ACT
art. 300(2) (S. Korea).
216. See COM. CODE art. 408(1) (S. Korea). Beyond the scope of an acting direc-
tor's authority are, for example, the convening of a special meeting of shareholders,
the acknowledgement of a claim, the issuance of new shares and debentures, the
delegation of all his authority by the acting representative director to another per-
son, withdrawal of appeal against a judgment in the first instance, and the transfer
of a substantial part of the business. South Korean Supreme Court Decisions of De-
cember 3, 1959, 4209 Minsang 669; October 26, 1965, 65 Da 1677; May 27, 1975, 75
Da 120; February 14, 1984, 83 Daka 875, 876, 877; and April 27, 1982, 81 Da 358.
The burden of proving that an action of an acting director is within his authority is
upon the third party who enters a transaction with the corporation. South Korean
Supreme Court Decision of October 26, 1965, 65 Da 1677. An act of an acting direc-
tor binds the corporation even if it is beyond his authority, provided that a third
party acts in good faith. COM. CODE art. 408(2) (S. Korea).
217. See COM. CODE art. 407 (S. Korea).
218. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 307(a)(8) (1990); COM. CODE art. 393(1) (S. Ko-
rea).
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performance of directors, especially representative directors. 19
By formulating and voting for resolutions, directors take action
as a body at duly convened board meetings at which a quorum is
present. 2°  Nevertheless, any directorial action beyond the
board's authority has binding force between the corporation and
a third party acting in good faith.221
In the United States, subject to procedures for board action,
the president or the chairman of the board presides at the board
222meeting. Since, in practice, the president is the chief execu-
tive officer in most corporations and has greater familiarity with
the affairs of the business of the corporation than anyone else,
he is in the best position to coordinate the operation of the cor-
poration with the functions of the board.222
In the United States, although the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act is silent on the point, directors generally may not
vote by proxy.224 However, some states do allow voting by proxy if
the articles of incorporation so provide.22 ' Also, most state stat-
utes now allow action by the board to be taken by means of a tele-
phone conference call or similar communications equipment.226
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation,
no notice is required to be given to the directors regarding a
regularly scheduled meeting, but at least two days advance no-
tice is required for special meetings.2 2 ' This notice is only re-
quired to provide the time and date of the meeting, but does not
need to provide the purpose of the meeting, unless so specified
219. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984); COM. CODE. arts. 393(1), 393(2)
(S. Korea).
220. Under both U.S. and South Korean law, the directors act as a collegial
body. See, e.g., COM. CODE arts. 391(1), 393(1) (S. Korea); Stone v. Am. Lacquer Sol-
vents Co., 345 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1975). The logic behind this requirement is that "the
decision making process is likely to function better when the directors consult with
and react to one another. A group discussion of problems is thought to be needed,
not just a series of yea or nay responses." CLARK, supra note 36, at 110.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974); see COM. CODE art. 408(2) (S. Korea); see also Billops v.
Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978).
222. CHARKHAM, supra note 2, at 182-84.
223. See HAROLD KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT 201-06 (1967).
224. CLARK, supra note 36, at 110.
225. However, Louisiana has a provision that proxy voting is permitted if the arti-
cles of incorporation so provide. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.81(E) (West 1969).
226. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.20(b) (1984); CAL. CORP. CODE §
307(a)(6) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(i) (1974).
227. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.22.
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by the articles of incorporation. At the meeting, a quorum is
established when a majority of directors are present, unless the
articles of incorporation specify the number required, which
number shall not go below one-third. 229 The quorum may adopt
a provision upon the vote of a majority, unless the articles of in-
corporation require a greater number of votes.23 °
No director is allowed to vote on a provision for which the
director is self-interested. 231 However, if the self-interested di-
rector does vote, and a majority of the directors who are disin-
terested have voted for the provision, the contract or transaction
is not void or voidable.232 This is true even if there is no quorum
after the interested directors are disqualified.2 3
The matters that directors are responsible for are the "busi-
ness and affairs" of the corporation or those functions that are
delineated by the articles of incorporation.21 4 The directors may
establish, by majority vote, committees consisting of as few as
one director to take on these duties.2 3' These committees may
exercise the same authority as the full board of directors in the
everyday running of the business, but may not make large deci-
sions such as changes to the articles of incorporation or deci-
sions regarding a merger.236
Minutes are to be taken and kept as permanent records of
director meetings and for actions taken without a meeting.237
The secretary of the corporation is usually the person responsi-
ble for recording and keeping the minutes.2 38 A director that at-
tends a meeting is assumed to assent to the actions taken by the
board, unless that person objects at the beginning of the meet-
ing, his dissent is entered in the minutes, or he delivers written
notice of his dissent to the presiding officer.239
The South Korean Commercial Code assigns certain re-
sponsibilities to the board, a sovereign body, in making corpo-
228. Id.
229. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.24; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (noting
that if the articles of incorporation provide for only one director, that director consti-
tutes a quorum).
230. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.24(c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b).
231. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. § 141(a).
235. Id. § 141(c)(1).
236. Id.
237. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.01(a) (1984).
238. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-1.40(22) (1975).
239. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.24(d).
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rate decisions. Matters that must be determined by the board
and cannot be entrusted to the shareholders include: convoca-
tion of a general meeting of shareholders,24 ° approval of a direc-
tor's transaction with the corporation for his own account or for
the account of a third person,24 1 and approval of financial state-
ments and business reports. 42 Unless the articles of incorpora-
tion provide to the contrary, the board has the authority to ap-
point a representative director or directors242  and issue
debentures with preemptive rights.244
In addition, every director of a South Korean corporation
has the individual right to attend a general meeting of the
shareholders, sign and seal the minutes of the board meeting,245
and convene board meetings.246 Notwithstanding the fact that
247
every director has the authority to convene a board meeting,
most boards of South Korean corporations designate a director
to do so. If the designated director does not convene a meeting
upon a director's request to do so without justifiable reasons,
then the requesting director may do so.24 8
Under South Korean law, the board meeting must normally
be preceded by notice to each director and statutory auditor.249
Notice must be given to statutory auditors since the law permits
them to attend, state their opinion, and report directors' wrong-
240. See COM. CODE art. 362 (S. Korea).
241. Id. at art. 398.
242. Id. at arts. 447, 447-2.
243. Id. at art. 389(1).
244. Id. at art. 516-2.
245. Id. at art. 373(2).
246. COM. CODE art. 390(1) (S. Korea).
247. Id.
248. South Korean Supreme Court Decisions of February 13, 1975, 74 Ma 595;
and February 10, 1976, 74 Da 2255. In practice, the board gives this authority to a
particular director, who is usually the president or the representative director, to
call the meeting. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 403. The individual right of convocation
may function as a means of supervising the representative director's performance.
249. COM. CODE art. 390(2) (S. Korea). Notice should be issued in an oral or writ-
ten form at least a week before the date set for such a meeting. CHUNG, supra note
18, at 403-04. Unlike a shareholders general meeting, the period of notice for the
board meeting may be shortened if provided for in the articles of incorporation. COM.
CODE art. 390(2) (S. Korea). The period must be long enough for the recipient to at-
tend the meeting, however. According to due procedure, it does not matter whether
the notice issued is actually received. Notice is not required where all the directors
and auditors have consented, before or with the event, to hold the meeting without
notice. Id. at art. 390(3). When all of the directors attend the meeting without waiv-
ing notice explicitly and unanimously, the meeting and the resolutions passed are
valid.
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ful acts at the board meeting.2 ° However, statutory auditors are
not entitled to vote at the meeting because they are not direc-
tors.251
The South Korean Commercial Code is silent as to how to
proceed with the meeting and who is to chair the board meet-
ing. Usually, a chairman, a president, or any other represen-
tative director of a corporation takes the role of presiding over
253the meeting. The articles of incorporation or bylaws contain
254the procedures involved in conducting a meeting.
In South Korea, a majority vote of those present at a meet-
ing where at least a majority of all the directors are physically
present is necessary for the board to pass a resolution.255
Through provisions in the articles of incorporation, the neces-
sary vote and quorum may be increased but cannot be de-
creased. Most South Korean corporations have a provision in
their articles of incorporation stating that the person who chairs
the meeting has the deciding vote when the votes are equally
divided.2 7
South Korean law contains some similar director formalities
as U.S. law. In South Korea, directors vote on a per capita basis
and cannot vote by proxy,258 nor can they participate in a meet-
ing through the use of letters.259 Telephones or other simultane-
ous audiovisual electronic devices, however, can be employed for
voting.260 Furthermore, under South Korean law, a director who
250. See id. at art. 391-2.
251. Cf. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Prob-
lems of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 200 (2000)
(stating that statutory auditors do not have decision-making power).
252. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 403.
253. See, e.g., Articles of Incorporation of Seoul Systems Company Ltd., art.
32(1); Articles of Incorporation of Samsung Electronics Company Ltd., arts. 29,
30(1).
254. See, e.g., Articles of Incorporation of Seoul Systems Company Ltd., art.
32(1); Articles of Incorporation of Samsung Electronics Company Ltd., arts. 29,
30(1).
255. COM. CODE art. 391(1) (S. Korea).
256. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 404-05.
257. See, e.g., Articles of Incorporation of Seoul Systems Company Ltd., art.
36(1); Articles of Incorporation of Hyundai Motor Company, art. 29(4).
258. See South Korean Supreme Court Decision of July 13, 1982, 80 Da 2441 (hold-
ing that unlike the voting of the general meeting of shareholders, voting by proxy at the
board meeting is void).
259. SONN, supra note 105, at 826.
260. COM. CODE art. 391(2) (S. Korea). Through the use of such technology, the
formalities of board meetings can be relaxed. When telephones are used as commu-
nications equipment for board meetings, their quorum could be established if one of
the absent directors could be reached by telephone. Id.
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is personally interested in the resolution cannot exercise his
vote, and his vote cannot be counted towards the quorum.2 6 1
Moreover, a recital of the proceedings must be contained in the
minutes, and then signed and sealed by the directors and audi-
tors present.262 Also, a director who has joined in the resolution
and whose dissent does not appear in the written minutes is
presumed to have assented to such resolution.263
The South Korean Commercial Code, however, does not
have a provision for the validity of a defective board resolution
that resulted from improper content or procedure.264 Such a
resolution is dealt with outside of the South Korean Commercial
Code. 65 It is dealt with by the general principles of nullity and
the provisions contained in the South Korean Civil Code.266
F. DELEGATION OF BOARD AUTHORITY
Because the board of directors is not expected to be familiar
with all the details of the corporation, management by the board
itself is impractical in the United States and South Korea.267 In
the United States, little or no direct involvement of the board in
day-to-day management prevails in large and medium-sized pub-
licly held corporations.268 An amendment to Section 35 of the
Model Business Corporation Act of 1969 was adopted in 1974 to
set forth a standard of conduct for directors and to define the au-
thority of the board of directors.269 The clause of the 1969 Act stat-
ing that, "the business and affairs of a corporation shall be man-
aged by a board of directors" was later amended to read "the
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the
direction of a board of directors."27 ° Much of the authority of the
261. COM. CODE arts. 368(4), 391(3) (S. Korea).
262. Id. at art. 391-3(1).
263. Id. at art. 399(3).
264. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 407-2.
265. C. LEE, supra note 184, at 138.
266. Id.
267. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAW, AMERICAN BAR Assoc., Corporate Director's
Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1603 (1978); K. Kim, supra note 19, at 142.
268. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAw, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., supra note 267, at 1603.
269. Id. at 1606-07. The opening sentence of Section 35 of the Model Business
Corporation Act of 1974 provides: "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or un-
der authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed un-
der the direction of, a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in this
Act or the articles of incorporation." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1974).
270. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (emphasis added). One of purposes of the
amendment was to make it clear that the authority of directors in the corporations can
be delegated to officers. See Elliot Goldstein, Future Articulation on Corporation Law,
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board of U.S. corporations is statutorily allowed to be delegated
to the chief executives or to the officers.271
Under the state corporate law of the United States, the
board of directors has the power to designate board commit-
tees. 72 The board has considerable discretion in determining
how a committee is formed, what function the committee per-
forms, and how the committee operates.2 3 Usually, the board
committee is composed of two or more directors, who often per-
form functions that otherwise would be within the province of the
authority of the entire board of directors.7 4
Similarly, the board of a South Korean corporation may
delegate some of its authority to representative directors or
other executive directors, or subcommittees of the board. A
representative director is usually selected from among the direc-
tors by the board.276 It can also be written into the articles of in-
corporation that shareholders shall appoint a representative di-
rector.277 South Korean law does not impose a statutory limit on
how many representative directors the corporation may have.278
Thus, a corporation may have more than one representative di-
rector.7 9 In addition, as a way to enhance the function of the
board of directors, the South Korean Commercial Code allows
the board to establish internal subcommittees within it.2 80 That
is, if the articles of incorporation provide for them, the board of
281directors may delegate part of its power to subcommittees.A representative director is empowered not only to take
39 Bus. LAW. 1541, 1545 (1984). Similarly, the Delaware Corporate Code has the provi-
sion that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation... shall be managed by or un-
der the direction of a board of directors." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974). The
phrase "managed by or under the direction of," both in the Model Business Corporation
Act and in the Delaware corporate statute, indicates that respective corporate boards
may function in a variety of ways. See id. (emphasis added).
271. See Goldstein, supra note 270, at 1545.
272. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1).
273. Corporate Director's Guidebook Third Edition, 56 Bus. LAW. 1571, 1597
(2001).
274. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c).
275. J. Kim, supra note 49, at 290.
276. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 410; Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 34.
277. COM. CODE art. 389(1) (S. Korea). In practice, representative directors, usually
selected from among the directors, have considerable authority in handling the day-to-
day management of a corporation. INTRODUCTION, supra note 76, at 847-48.
278. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 411.
279. See id. The name of the representative director must be registered. COM. CODE
art. 317(2)[9] (S. Korea).
280. See J. Kim, supra note 49, at 290.
281. COM. CODE art. 393-2 (S. Korea).
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charge of internal corporate business, but also to represent the
corporation.2 82 His authority to represent a corporation runs the
whole gamut of all corporate business, both judicial and extra-
judicial.2sa Limitations may be imposed on the representative
director's power by the articles of incorporation, but they cannot
be raised as a defense against a third party acting in good faith
reliance on the representative director's representations.2 4
Once joint representation among multiple representative direc-
tors is established, one representative director cannot act with-
out the consent of the other.29  Therefore, the requirement of
joint representation has a chilling effect on a representative di-
rector's misbehavior.
Actions of a representative director are preceded by a valid
board resolution 6 When a board resolution is void, this creates
the problem of whether a representative director's action is
valid.287 In seeking the answer to this problem, the protection of
bona fide third parties should be taken into account.2 8 Consen-
sus exists among South Korean scholars that transactions that
involve the public, such as sales or loans and issuance of deben-
289tures, are not dependent upon the validity of the resolution.
However, completely intra-corporate transactions, such as
transfers of reserve funds to capital and the appointment of a
manager, are affected by the void resolution and are thus re-
garded as void. 29' The South Korean Supreme Court supports
this view and further states that a representative director's act,
made upon a void board resolution, will be valid even if the cor-
poration he serves proves that the third parties acted in bad
282. See id. at arts. 209(1), 389(3).
283. See id. at arts. 209(1), 389(3). The phrase "both judicial and extra-judicial"
means to be "both in- and out-of-court."
284. Id. at arts. 209(2), 389(3).
285. See id. at art. 389(2). If a corporation requires representative directors to act
jointly, this restriction must be registered. Id. at arts. 317(2)[10], 389(2). Even if joint
representation is not registered, a transaction between a single representative director
and a third party in good faith is effective against the corporation. Id. at art. 37(1). After
the registration, a transaction is binding on the corporation when it is made between a
single representative director and a person who is unaware of joint representation for
any due reason. Id. at art. 37(2). Ifjoint representation is required for all representative
directors, notice issued by a third party to only one of the directors is binding on the cor-
poration. Id. at arts. 208(2), 389(3).
286. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 416-17.
287. Id. at 417.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See C. LEE, supra note 184, at 554.
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faith.291
If a representative director acts in bad faith against the
corporation, the representative director is subject to removal
from his position in the same way a director is. When a repre-
sentative director loses his position due to removal by the
shareholders, the expiration of his term of office as a director, or
resignation, he can no longer serve as a representative direc-t 292
tor. When the board terminates his office as a representative
director, however, he remains a director. 3
III. GOVERNANCE ROLE OF STATUTORY AUDITORS AND
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
A. AN OVERVIEW
In the United States, only one jurisdiction has had an ex-
press statutory provision requiring the establishment of an au-
dit committee.294 Nevertheless, under the rules of the New York
Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange,
publicly listed corporations are required or recommended to es-tablsh a audt ._ 295
tablish an audit committee. Under U.S. law, the primary
function of the committee is to "assist the board of directors with
the development and maintenance of the corporate accountabil-
ity framework."
296
Under the South Korean Commercial Code, however, a chu-
sik hoesa is required to be audited by one or more statutory
- 297
auditors. The corporation may, in accordance with the articles
291. See South Korean Supreme Court Decision of March 24, 1998, 95 Da 6885.
292. See CHUNG, supra note 18, at 411.
293. Id.
294. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-318(b)(1) (repealed 1997).
295. See Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 12. The New York Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ require audit committees, while the American Stock Exchange
only recommends that a company have an audit committee. Scott V. Simpson, The
Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protec-
tion in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transac-
tions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAW. 665, 666 n.3 (1988) (citing New
York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual paras. 303.00, 802.00 (1987);
NASDAQ National Market System Listing Agreement para. 1(c) (1987); [2] Am.
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 121, para. 10.021 (1985)).
296. Louis BRAIOTrA, JR., THE AUDIT DiREcTOR's GUIDE: How TO SERVE
EFFECTIVELY ON THE CORPORATE AuDIT COMJMTEE 24 (1981) (emphasis added). The
audit committee is therefore a quasi-assistant to the board of directors.
297. COM. CODE art. 568(1) (S. Korea). In South Korea, listed corporations on the
securities market and corporations with total assets of seven billion won or more must
[Vo1.12:2
20031 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 331
of incorporation, establish an audit committee in place of statu-
tory auditors.298 Statutory auditors and audit committees under
the South Korean Commercial Code are different from the audit
committee under U.S. law, in that they work as adversaries to
management and monitor the directors' overall performance.299
They are empowered to act on a continuous basis as an inde-
pendent watchdog and to act in the interests of the shareholders
and creditors. °°
B. NUMBER AND QUALIFICATIONS OF STATUTORY AUDITORS AND
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
Statutory auditors are completely foreign to U.S. law. Even
though the United States does not have statutory auditors per
se like South Korea, there are statutes that provide for auditing
of corporations to ensure the reliability of corporate financial
reports.'' Congress requires that certain financial reports be
reviewed by outside accountants, who are deemed independent
auditors.302
Furthermore, state laws and the rules of stock exchanges do
be audited by outside auditors, usually Certificated Public Accountants (CPAs) or audit
corporations. See LAW CONCERNING OUTSIDE AUDIT OF A CHUSIK HOESA, No. 3297, art.
2 (amended 1981); Presidential Decree No. 10453, art. 2 (amended 1981). Compared
with outside auditors, statutory auditors are also called "inside auditors" or "internal
auditors." Kon Sik Kim, Corporate Governance in Korea, 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MKT.
L. 21, 26-27 (1986) (using the term "inside auditors" instead of "statutory auditors"); see
K. Kim, supra note 19, at 148 (using the term "internal auditors"). Outside auditors are
not statutorily authorized to perform the function of monitoring directors. The functions
of outside auditors are:
(1) to audit the financial statements and submit an audit report to the cor-
poration.. .; (2) to report any improper acts committed by a director in per-
forming his duties and any material violations of law or the articles of in-
corporation...; and (3) to attend shareholder meetings upon request of the
shareholders and present opinion or answer questions ....
K Kim, supra note 19, at 152. In South Korea, CPAs are accountants who are qualified
to engage in the accounting profession after passing a national examination and serving
as probationary CPAs for at least two years. For the licensing and training require-
ments of becoming a CPA in South Korea, see Belverd E. Needles, Jr. et al., Taxonomy
of Auditing Standards, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 6.14 (Frederick
D.S. Choi ed., 1991).
298. COM. CODE art. 415-2(1) (S. Korea).
299. See J. Kim, supra note 49, at 290-92.
300. See Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 34.
301. Joseph I. Goldstein & Catherine Dixon, New Teeth for the Public's Watch-
dog: The Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant in Detecting, Preventing, and
Reporting Financial Fraud, 44 BUS. LAw. 439, 439-40 (1989).
302. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25)-(26), 78q(e), 781(b)(J)-(K), 78m(a)(2),
78n(a), 79e(b)(2)(H)-(I), 79j(a), 80a-8(b)(5), 80a-29(e), 80b-3(c) (1982)).
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not normally require audit committees.3 °3 When an audit com-
mittee is required, there is no uniformity as to the requirements
of their number and qualifications.3 04 The sole uniform require-
ment or recommendation is that the audit committee remain in-
dependent of management.3 5
Conversely, under South Korean law, one or more statutory
auditors are to be appointed at the general meeting of share-
holders for a period of typically three years.0 6 Since the term of
office for statutory auditors is provided in the South Korean
Commercial Code, they enjoy job security and independent au-
thority.307 They cannot concurrently be directors, managers, or
employees of the corporation to be audited30 or one of its sub-
sidiaries. 30 9 This statutory provision is aimed at ensuring inde-
pendence and impartiality. In order to eliminate the influence
of majority shareholders, any shareholder owning more than
three percent of the outstanding voting shares is not allowed to
exercise his vote on his shares in excess of the three percent in
the election of statutory auditors.310
Since the South Korean Commercial Code does not specify
the requirements for being a statutory auditor, almost all statu-
tory auditors of South Korean corporations are neither inde-
pendent from the management nor professionally trained.31' In
the real world, the independence and objectivity of statutory
auditors are not guaranteed in South Korea.1 2 There is some
protection, however, in that statutory auditors and audit com-
mittee members must exercise the same degree of care as direc-
tors in managing the corporation.3 3 Since they do not partici-
pate in managing the corporation, there is no danger of a
303. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
304. For example, the NASDAQ requires audit committees to have at least three
members and be comprised solely of independent members. See supra note 302 and
accompanying text. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA) mandates banks and savings institutions with assets more than $500
million to have an independent audit committee. FDICIA of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (Supp. IV 1992)).
305. Kevin Iurato, Warning! A Position on the Audit Committee Could Mean
Greater Exposure to Liability: The Problems with Applying a Heightened Standard of
Care to the Corporate Audit Committee, 30 STETSON L. REV. 977, 981 (2001).
306. COM. CODE arts. 409(1), 410 (S. Korea).
307. J. Kim, supra note 49, at 291.
308. COM. CODE art. 411 (S. Korea).
309. J. Kim, supra note 49, at 291-92.
310. COM. CODE art. 409(2) (S. Korea).
311. Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 12, at 34.
312. Id.
313. COM. CODE arts. 382(2), 415 (S. Korea).
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conflict of interest occurring between the corporation and its
- 314
statutory auditors.
If an audit committee is established to replace the functions
of statutory auditors, it must consist of at least three mem-
bers.3 15 Persons who have personal or business relations with
the largest shareholder of the corporation or the corporation it-
self, shall not exceed one-third of the total members of the com-
mittee.316 Therefore, more than two-thirds of the audit commit-
tee members are outside auditors who are independent from the
management and controlling shareholders.3 17
C. POWERS OF STATUTORY AUDITORS AND THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
In the United States, the audit committee plays an impor-
tant role in enhancing corporate accountability by "oversee[ing]
and monitor[ing] the activities of the corporation's financial re-
porting system and the internal and external audit processes."318
The listing standards and state and federal securities laws do
not require any specific functions or structure of the audit com-
mittee, but the primary purpose of the audit committee in prac-
.- 319
tice is to monitor the internal operations of the corporation.
The audit committee, like any other committee in U.S. cor-
porations, is composed of directors of the corporation.3 2 0 Because
the audit committee is composed of directors, they have com-
plete access to information and attend director meetings.32 1
Unlike the other members of the board of directors, though, the
audit committee is usually held to a higher standard of care
than their outside director counterparts; this subjects audit
committee members to a greater potential for liability. 22
As stated above, the "watchdog" function of the statutory
314. See Kim & Silverman, supra note 12, at 217.
315. COM. CODE art. 415-2(2) (S. Korea).
316. Id.
317. See id.
318. BRAJOrrA, supra note 296, at 24; see also Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate
Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J.
CORP. L. 349, 361-62 (2000) (introducing various functions of the audit committee);
Lewis D. Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope -
Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 606-09 (1978) (viewing the audit committee
as an instrument for monitoring management).
319. See Iurato, supra note 305, at 981, 985.
320. See Simpson, supra note 295, at 665-66; see also supra note 203 and accom-
panying text.
321. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 273, at 1599-1603.
322. Iurato, supra note 305, at 987-96.
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auditors, under South Korean law, include auditing accounting
matters as well as the managerial activities of directors. 323
Statutory auditors are presumed to have full access to corporate
records and reports.32 ' They have the right at any time to re-
quest a report from the directors regarding their operations, to
investigate the affairs of the corporation, and to investigate the
status of the corporation's property.125 Statutory auditors per-
form the duty of examining all matters proposed to be resolved
and documents to be presented by the directors at the annual
general shareholders' meeting.321 In addition, they are author-
ized to express their opinions at the meeting if all or part of the
documents violate regulations or the articles of incorporation or
are seriously unfair.327 Statutory auditors are obligated to de-
mand that a director halt his act contemplated in violation of
the law or the articles of incorporation if it is likely to cause ir-
• 3281
reparable harm to the corporation.
As a watchdog, a statutory auditor has a variety of tasks.
Most importantly, statutory auditors are empowered to inspectthe erfomanc of . . 329
the performance of directors. Statutory auditors may attend
meetings of the board of directors, give their opinions, 330 and
sign and seal the minutes,331 but they are not entitled to vote at
the board meeting.332 As mentioned previously, they have to
333perform their duties with the care a director would exercise.
Therefore, frequent absence from board meetings without cause
may suggest a breach of the duty of care.334 Interestingly, statu-
tory auditors are authorized to represent the corporation in any
action brought by the corporation against a director, and vice
versa. 33 They also have the right to file with the court an actionto rvok s aehoder . 336
to revoke shareholder resolutions and to nullify an issuance of
323. COM. CODE art. 412 (S. Korea).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at art. 413.
327. Id.
328. Id. at art. 402.
329. COM. CODE art. 412(1) (S. Korea).
330. Id. at art. 391-2. For this reason, notices of board meetings are required to be
given to statutory auditors. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
331. COM. CODE art. 391-3 (S. Korea).
332. CHUNG, supra note 18, at 480.
333. COM. CODE arts. 382(2), 415 (S. Korea).
334. C. LEE, supra note 184.
335. COM. CODE art. 394 (S. Korea).
336. Id. at art. 376(1).
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new shares, a merger, an incorporation of the corporation," 9
and a capital reduction.34 °
Nonetheless, a majority of South Korean law scholars be-
lieve that statutory auditors are empowered only to ensure and
confirm that all managerial activities of the directors are lawful,
unless the law expressly permits statutory auditors to review
the reasonableness of directorial action.34' The rationale is that
if the authority of statutory auditors encompasses measuring
the reasonableness of every managerial activity, then conflict
would ensue and lead to a denial of the legal authority of the
board to oversee board members. 342 The South Korean courts
have yet to handle a case on the authority of statutory auditors.
Failure of the auditors to perform their duties would subject
them to civil liability.343 Auditors are jointly and severally liable
for the corporation's damages for negligence in connection with
statutory audits.344 They are not released from liability without
the unanimous consent of all shareholders.34' If statutory audi-
tors willfully neglect any of their duties or are grossly negligent
in the course of their activities, they are jointly and severally li-
able for any damages to third parties.346
In South Korea, the powers of the audit committee are not
different from those of statutory auditors since the former can
be established in place of the latter.347 However, two-thirds of
the audit committee members do not have any interests with
the company, the management, or the controlling shareholder.34'
The audit committee members function more neutrally and ob-
jectively than statutory auditors.34'
CONCLUSION
The corporation is one of the most remarkable and success-
337. Id. at art. 429.
338. Id. at art. 529.
339. Id. at art. 328.
340. Id. at art. 445.
341. See, e.g., C. LEE, supra note 184, at 647.
342. COM. CODE art. 393(2) (S. Korea).
343. Id. at art. 414.
344. Id. at art. 414(2).
345. Id. at arts. 400, 415.
346. Id. at art. 414(2).
347. J. Kim, supra note 50, at 291.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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ful institutions in modern history, having a considerable effect
on almost all aspects of our lives.35 ° There have been significant
improvements in communication and mutual understanding be-
tween the United States and South Korea.35' South Koreans
have monitored the successes and failures of the law in the
United States and some rules, which proved to be viable, have
won wide acceptance in South Korea.35' Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that much of South Korean corporate law is influenced• 353
by principles of U.S. corporate law and practice.
A simple example of U.S. influence is the fact that the theo-
retical legal framework for the South Korean system of corpo-
rate governance is based on the traditional U.S. model of corpo-
rate democracy. Under both U.S. corporate law and the South
Korean Commercial Code, the role of the board of directors is
emphasized to make corporate management more effective. The
board is granted the authority to exercise corporate manage-
ment functions and finally to act as the principal forum for deci-
sion-making.
Despite the similarities, however, South Korean and U.S.
corporate law have distinct differences. Shareholders under
South Korean law and directors under U.S. law, select statutory
auditors or audit committee members who work as monitors of
directors' overall performance. Additionally, the functions of
statutory auditors and the audit committee under the South Ko-
rean Commercial Code are different from those of the audit
committee under U.S. law. Furthermore, U.S. law provides for
officers in corporate governance, which does not have a counter-
part in South Korean law.
350. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (stating that "[t]hrough size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool em-
ployed by individuals in the conduct of private business, have become an institution
- which has brought such concentration of economic power that so-called private
corporations are sometimes able to dominate the State"). See also Alfred F. Conard,
Business Corporations in American Society, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978, 41-42 (Donald
E. Schwartz ed., 1979); Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by
Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 176 (1957).
351. Kwon, supra note 11, at 1095.
352. See Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
313, 321 (1978) (arguing that transplantation of law is the most common form of le-
gal change).
353. See generally Kang, supra note 114.
354. For example, the right to elect directors which is regarded as the corner-
stone of corporate democracy is vested in shareholders both in U.S. and South Ko-
rean law. CHARKHAM, supra note 2, at 188.
336 [Vol. 12:2
